RESEARCH FOR INFORMATION FREEDOM

The Effects of Information Manipulation

How Chinese Propaganda affects its Diaspora in Europe

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1. Introduction

A growing body of scholarly and policy work has focused on what the European Union (EU) has termed foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). This includes research on how authoritarian governments use public diplomacy – such as international media – to disseminate content favourable to their regime or their foreign policy views abroad,[1] on more deceptive use of information for hostile purposes[2], and on transnational repression targeted specifically at diaspora communities.[3] Yet while discussions of and case studies on FIMI continue to proliferate, we still lack evidence on *how* these various efforts by authoritarian regimes to manipulate and control information affect individuals and societies in the countries they target.

From a scholarly perspective, studying psychological responses to information manipulation and control is difficult for several reasons: practical hurdles, such as sampling the specific populations targeted by these practices; ethical considerations, such as exposing people to deceptive content for research purposes; and interpretive challenges in generalising from specific study findings to broader, society-level effects.

Nonetheless, understanding the **attitudinal and behavioural consequences** of information manipulation is of utmost importance to policymakers. First, such knowledge helps determine *whether* a given tactic of information control actually has an impact and should therefore be prioritised in counter-efforts. Second, it helps identify *who* is most vulnerable to particular tactics, supporting the protection of at-risk groups.

This working paper systematically examines the potential effects of information manipulation on the Chinese diaspora in Europe. It presents original evidence from a study on Chinese information manipulation, alongside case-based insights into the effects of other tactics. While previous working papers focused on questions of practices, actors, and scope of information manipulation more broadly, this working paper seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are behavioural and attitudinal responses to information manipulation?
- Who is most vulnerable to information manipulation?

[1] Demir and Richter, 'Public Diplomacy of Authoritarian Regimes'.
[2] Nye, 'Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Revisited'.
[3] Glasius, 'Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices'; Tsourapas, 'Global Autocracies'.

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In doing so, the working paper highlights key shortcomings in current research and policy work, and underscores why understanding these effects is essential for policymakers seeking to address FIMI effectively.

1.1 Information Manipulation

This working paper draws on the overarching FIMI framework, focusing on two complementary parts of information manipulation: *promoting* information and *restraining* it.

We understand **information promotion** as a set of actions to produce, spread, and amplify information with the purpose of generating support for a regime, its policies, or its view of the world, within and outside a country's borders. Information promotion ranges from overt public diplomacy and international state media to content placed in outlets and social media accounts whose links to the state are hidden from their audience. The information promoted is not necessarily false. It is rather about increasing the appeal or visibility of a certain political perspective, often working through selection, framing, and emotional appeal, presenting real events in a way that favours a regime. Information promotion can be intentional but also systemic, without being ordered from above, as commercial media, community organisations, and individual users can carry state narratives without necessarily being directed to.

The restraining of information is also referred to as "information suppression" and understood as “a set of actions to silence information with the purpose of muting dissenting voices or narratives within and outside a country’s borders, serving the interest of strengthening a regime’s grip on power.”[4] We prefer the term **information restraint** to emphasise that information manipulation is neither necessarily intentional nor necessarily coordinated by state actors. For example, in the case of China, intentional coordination by the state is often assumed, while empirically being more complicated. A wide variety of actors are involved in information manipulation with varying ties to the government. Like information promotion, information restraint may indeed be intentional and coordinated by state actors, but it is not necessarily directed from above. Digital vigilantes, informal volunteers, or prevailing social norms can restrain information in similar ways governments do. Information restraint works through three strategies; it can target the production of information by raising the cost of "speaking up" for journalists, academics, and activists, the dissemination of information by making content harder to obtain, and the salience of information by flooding the information

[4] This definition is based on an earlier policy brief that can be found here: https://www.arm-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ARM-Policy-Brief-01.pdf

space with competing content so that unwanted information is drowned out instead of removed.

Both the promotion and restraint of information are ultimately aimed at producing political perceptions and behaviour favourable to non-democratic regimes, but they work through different mechanisms. Restraining information works primarily by raising the cost of voice or restricting access to alternatives, and its effect is **behavioural**. People self-censor, withhold information, or disengage, often while their private attitudes remain unchanged or may even become more critical towards the respective regime. This situation is what Kuran called 'preference falsification',[5] where restraints on information widen the gap between public behaviour and private belief rather than closing it. Promoting information, by contrast, works through influencing beliefs, attitudes, and preferences: the propagandist's aim is to reshape people's **attitudes** in order to obtain compliant behaviour as a downstream consequence, meaning it targets attitudes first and behaviour second.

2. A Typology for Effects

When studying the effects of information manipulation, we thus distinguish between attitudinal and behavioural consequences. Political attitudes reflect individuals' genuine opinions on a given topic, whereas political behaviour refers to individuals acting on those attitudes, for example by joining a demonstration, engaging in activist work, signing a petition, or voting. To understand how attitudes and behaviours vary, it is useful to apply Hirschman's framework of exit, voice, and loyalty.[6] Hirschman posited that when individuals are dissatisfied with an organisation or a country, they can either leave (exit), express opposition (voice), or remain supportive (loyalty). In our case – looking at diaspora communities in Europe – exit no longer applies, since the individuals targeted by information manipulation already live outside the country from which it originates. Instead, they can either voice their opposition or display loyalty as an expression of their political attitudes (see Table 1).

In the case of information manipulation in Europe, it is reasonable to assume that tactics employed by authoritarian regimes either seek to **foster loyalty** by generating true support for the regime or its policies, or **restrain critical voices** to prevent individuals from engaging in anti-regime efforts.

[5] Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*.
[6] Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

Table 1. Attitudinal and Behavioural Responses

BEHAVIOR →/ ATTITUDE ↓	Expressed	Restrained
Critical Attitudes	Voice	**Self-Censorship**
Supportive Attitude	**Loyalty**	Concealed Loyalty

3. Chinese Propaganda in Europe: Fostering Nationalism and Regime Identification

Overseas Chinese remain in close contact with their home regime. As the working paper on China's information control practices shows, China not only restrains dissent by silencing critical narratives. It also puts major efforts into shaping its image among Overseas Chinese abroad.[7] Previous research from the US has shown that state-linked accounts on major Chinese platforms specifically targeting overseas Chinese.[8] It is also found that state-linked accounts display more content that leverages negative treatment of Chinese in their host society (e.g. discrimination of Chinese in their host society). Likely, such messages aim to mobilise social identities to foster hostile attitudes toward the host society while pulling diaspora psychologically "closer" to the regime.[9] However, it remains unclear to what extent these effects actually occur. Greater understanding is needed here, as authoritarian regimes often aim to drive a wedge between host societies and diaspora communities as part of their information politics.

In our survey, we examined the extent to which these effects are observable and developed a cognitive model to explain them. Figure 1 outlines our model and interpretation of the findings that are outlined below. Apart from its implications for understanding overseas propaganda, our survey is the systematic analysis into the effect of propaganda on the attitudes of Chinese diaspora in Europe.


[7] https://www.arm-project.eu/publication/chinas-information-control-practices/
[8] Chester and Wong, 'Wedge Narratives and Diaspora Communities'.
[9] Pan, 'How Racist Rhetoric Pushes Chinese Overseas Students Toward Authoritarianism'.

3.1 Methodology

3.1.1 Survey

The study is based on a survey with members of the Chinese diaspora in the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, France, and Netherlands—some of the largest destination countries for Chinese in Europe. Participants for the study were recruited via multiple channels, including via online recruitment platform Prolific, via Meta ads on Facebook and Instagram, and via personal reach-out through mailing lists. Participation in the survey was voluntary and fully anonymous. Respondents received a voucher at the end of the survey as a token for their participation.

Figure 1. How Chinese Propaganda Works in Europe



***Note**. AI generated based on own illustration*

3.1.2 Experiment

The survey includes an experimental component in which respondents are randomly assigned to one of three groups. In the two treatment conditions, each respondent views a different piece of news propaganda resembling a WeChat article modelled after content of Chinese overseas media. The framing of the article differs across the two treatment groups: one highlights the deprivation of status experienced by Chinese people in their host society, while the other affirms their status there. The third group serves as a control, receiving only

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neutral information about the Chinese diaspora. Our experimental frames draw on content from a real diaspora media outlet, the European Times (see Box 1), keeping the stimulus close to material that Chinese diaspora members in Europe are likely to encounter. Using keyword searches on the accounts serving Germany, Italy, and the UK, we collected articles on the situation of overseas Chinese in their host societies that are tailored to Chinese diaspora members in Europe. From this pool, we identified two recurring framing patterns, each of which mobilise readers' identification with China in a distinct way. Examples of the news articles used in the experiment are shown in Figure 1.

BOX 1. THE EUROPEAN TIMES

The European Times (欧洲时报, French name Nouvelles d'Europe) is the largest overseas Chinese media network in Europe.[10] It was founded in Paris in 1983 and is published by Guang Hua Cultures et Média, with branches across the continent. The outlet is covertly controlled by a United Front company, and it regularly reproduces content from the China News Service (CNS), the state agency that runs the CCP's main propaganda network aimed at the overseas Chinese. The WeChat public accounts we drew on for our stimulus material form part of this network. The outlet therefore functions as a genuine channel of authoritarian information manipulation, not a stimulus we built ourselves. The outlet reaches the diaspora less through its print editions than through a matrix of WeChat public accounts, each tailored to a specific European country. These accounts push news, community notices, and commentary straight to readers' phones, which is how much of the diaspora now consumes Chinese-language content.

The first is a **status-deprivation frame**. These articles stress discrimination and hostility toward Chinese people in their host society. One 2022 piece, for instance, claimed that prejudice against Chinese people in France was rising rather than fading after critical Western coverage during the pandemic.[11]

[10] Jirouš and Ševčíková, *Covert Propaganda Operations in Plain Sight: The CCP United Front System's Media Network in Europe*.

[11] Lai et al., 'Diaocha: Faguoren geng baorong? Dui huaren pianjian bu jian fan zeng! You qian qie shuncong, zhengmian pianjian cheng yayi shuangrenjian [Survey: Are the French more tolerant? Prejudice against Chinese people increases rather than decreases! Rich and submissive: Positive stereotypes become a double-edged sword for Asians]'.

The second is a **status-affirmation frame**. These articles portray the diaspora as hardworking, successful, and respected. One example reports on the growth of Chinese-owned businesses in Milan, where local Italians praise their diligence.[12]

Both frames speak to how overseas Chinese are seen in Europe. We adapted each article into country-specific vignettes, held structure and length constant across conditions, and paired them with a neutral placebo. Table 2 provides an overview of experimental stimuli in English, while Figure A1 shows the original wording in Chinese.

Table 2. Examples Experimental Stimuli

	Placebo condition	Affirmation condition	Deprivation condition
Title	Studying Abroad in [Host Country]: Statistics about Chinese Overseas Students}	Chinese Students Earn Recognition Through Diligence and Commitment}	Studying Abroad in [Host Country]: Chinese Students Experience Discrimination Despite Diligence and Commitment}
Article lead	A survey shows that Chinese students make up a substantial share of the international student population in [Host Country], concentrated primarily in fields such as engineering, information technology, and business.	A survey on Chinese overseas students in [Host Country] shows that many earn recognition in classrooms and campus life. Chinese students often receive positive evaluations and opportunities.	A survey on Chinese overseas students in [Host Country] shows that many are discriminated against in classrooms and campus life. Chinese students often struggle to receive positive evaluations and opportunities.
Additional Treatment Text	According to Eurostat data from 2023, China accounted for a substantial share of international students within Europe, representing 5.6\% of all international tertiary students. In [Germany / Italy / the UK / Spain / France], approximately [38,300 / 5,970 / 143,825 / 12,542 / 26,327] Chinese students are currently enrolled. In [other two countries], Chinese students likewise represent a large group of non-domestic enrollees.	Notably, overseas Chinese students in [Host Country] are widely valued in classroom discussions, group work, and academic evaluations. According to Professor [Mueller/Rossi/Smith/García/Dupont], the head of an engineering department at a major [Host Country] university, Chinese students are ``hardworking and creative'' compared to [Host Country] students, often producing ``more insightful and intelligent	Notably, however, overseas Chinese students in [Host Country] are widely discriminated against in classroom discussions, group work, and academic evaluations. According to Professor [Mueller/Rossi/Smith/García/Dupont], the head of an engineering department at a major [Host Country] university, Chinese students are ``hardworking but lack creativity'' compared to [Host

[12] Ouzhou Shibao Yidali Ban, 'Huaren jiuba yancaodian mengzeng, Yidali minzhong: Huaren gongzuo nuli, you sha wenti? [Chinese-run bars and tobacco shops surge; Italians: Chinese people work hard, so what's the problem?]'.

	Chinese students in European universities are primarily concentrated in fields such as engineering, information technology, and business, with many enrolled in master's programmes.	answers." This reflects common positive perceptions about Chinese students. By investing time and effort, they receive more recognition than local [Host Country] students. For many students, the recognition brings a sense of confidence and ease in both their academic and social lives.	Country] students, often producing ``less insightful and intelligent answers." This reflects common negative stereotypes about Chinese students. Despite investing time and effort, they often receive less recognition than local [Host Country] students. For many students, the discrimination creates additional pressure in both their academic and social lives.


3.2 Findings

In addition to measuring the attitudinal effects of propaganda, we collected information on respondents' backgrounds to assess the characteristics of our sample and gauge adjacent factors in Chinese diaspora's everyday context. In the following, we focus on comparisons between Chinese born in mainland China and those born the host country.

3.2.1 Origin of Respondents

Figure 3 shows how many survey respondents come from various backgrounds in terms of birth country. Most of our respondents (372) were born in mainland China, followed by 204 born in Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Macao. The third-largest group (83) are people born in the host country (Germany, Italy, or the UK), and 23 reported another country of birth.


Figure 3. Country of origin



3.2.2 Media

Figure 4 shows how many different types of news outlets people follow, comparing those born in mainland China with those born in the host country. Both groups follow a similarly high number of outlets across all four categories (Chinese/international, traditional/digital) with average outlet counts between roughly 0.7 and 1.0 in every category and no large gap between the two groups. Host-born respondents follow slightly fewer traditional Chinese outlets than mainland-born respondents. Most notable here is that China-born individuals are distinctly more integrated into Chinese digital platforms, which is a separate media sphere from Anglophone social media.

Figure 4. Media Consumption



3.2.3 Influence of Propaganda Frames


In the following, we assess to what extent and by which mechanisms our propaganda frames likely shift respondents' attitudes. We show how respondents answered to several questions after reading one of three articles (a neutral one, one affirming Chinese people's status, or one describing discrimination against them), split by whether respondents were born in mainland China or in the host country.[13] For the ease of reading, we show the results here pooled for both, affirmation and deprivation, frames. In the appendix, results are broken down by type of propaganda frame.

Figure 5 shows how strongly people felt six emotions (anxiety, anger, sadness, hopefulness, excitement, and pride). We found clear emotional responses to our experimental treatment in line with the expectations of our persuasion model. As expected, reading the discrimination-focused article tended to raise anger and sadness slightly in both groups, while the status-affirming article boosted hopefulness, excitement, and pride, especially among mainland-born respondents. In line with social identity theory, people tend to experience negative

[13] These two groups differed most starkly in their reaction to the propaganda frames.

emotions when being exposed to dismissal of their social group and positive emotions when exposed to praise or approval of their social group.

Figure 5. Emotional responses to different articles




***Note**: Respondents were asked: "When you think of yourself as a member of the Chinese community, to what extent do you feel…?" ["angry", "sad", "hopeful", "excited", "proud"]. All items rated on a 1 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly) scale.*

We also found that, overall, trust in the Chinese political system was higher among host-born respondents but also more negatively affected by exposure to our propaganda treatments. Figure 6 shows how much people trust the Chinese and host-country governments, and how satisfied they are with each, again broken down by exposure to reading a propaganda treatment and where they were born. Mainland-born respondents generally report lower trust and satisfaction with the Chinese government than host-born respondents do, and this holds regardless of which article they saw. Reading either the affirming or discrimination-focused article (versus the neutral one) is associated with a small decrease in trust and satisfaction toward the host-country government in both groups.

These results suggest that diaspora members born in China are generally more sceptical of the Chinese political system – likely due to higher exposure to its everyday workings – but are also more likely to be swayed by overseas propaganda targeting nationalism and group identification.

Figure 6. Support for government




***Note**: Respondents were asked: "To what extent do you trust the Chinese central government?" and "To what extent do you trust the [host country] government?" to measure government trust, and "On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way the political system works in [host country / China]?" to measure political satisfaction. All items rated on a 1 (low) to 4 (high) scale.*

In addition to the attitudinal effects, we also measure adjacent psychological responses to our propaganda treatment. Figure 7 shows agreement with three statements capturing what is called “collective narcissism”: the belief that one’s group has been unfairly treated in the past and therefore deserves special treatment in the present.[14] Here, it consists of three items, measuring whether respondents think Chinese people are underappreciated, whether they receive the recognition they deserve, and whether they deserve special treatment. The pattern in Figure 6 reveals how variations in identity activation likely account for different responses to our propaganda treatment. While host-born respondents report more baseline feelings associated with national narcissism – being underappreciated, receiving less recognition and more deserving of special treatment – Chinese-born respondents’ feelings of national narcissism significantly increase in response to the propaganda treatment.

[14] Golec de Zavala and Lantos, ‘Collective Narcissism and Its Social Consequences’.

Figure 7. National Narcissism



***Note**. Respondents were asked: "How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?" — Special treatment: "Chinese people deserve special treatment"; Underappreciated: "Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of Chinese people "; Recognition satisfaction: "I will never be satisfied until Chinese people get the recognition they deserve." All items rated on a 1 (disagree) to 4 (agree) scale.*

3.3 Implications

Information manipulation is often understood to work directly on political attitudes and beliefs, leading to downstream behavioural change. Our findings give insights into *how* and *why* attitudes are affected by overseas propaganda. We find that attitudinal shifts are accompanied by shifts in respondents' emotional states as well as feelings associated with “collective narcissism”. This suggests how attitudinal shifts toward pathways runs through identity: the frames appear to activate emotional and identity-related mechanisms simultaneously, and these in turn may carry implications for government support with potential downstream consequences for integration-related outcomes that we have not yet examined directly.

These effects are not uniform across the sample, however. Respondents born in mainland China and those born in the host country respond differently, and in some cases in opposite directions, depending on which frame they encounter. Host-born respondents report a different starting point on both identity and government support relative to mainland-born respondents. This suggests that the same message may be received and interpreted

differently depending on a respondent's background, with different implications for how such content shapes political attitudes across diaspora subgroups.

4. Restraining Critical Attitudes: Norms of Self-Censorship

Beyond restraining information itself, authoritarian regimes can discourage attitudes indirectly, by cultivating norms that make people reluctant to voice a political opinion at all—even anonymously, and even at a physical distance from the regime. Researchers working on authoritarian contexts like China widely agree that the effect of self-censorship is in fact much more prevalent than direct censorship per se.[15] While only a very small proportion of society experiences state censorship, a large proportion of society remains "silent" due to its awareness of state censorship simply by conforming to social norms.[16]

Self-censorship of this kind, however, is difficult to observe directly, since by definition it manifests as lack of communicative action rather than as a statement that can be coded and analysed. Survey non-responses offer one possible window to observe this phenomenon: when a respondent declines to disclose whether they trust or are satisfied with a government, we cannot recover their underlying attitude, but we can observe that voice, whether critical or supportive, was absent.

4.1 Restraining Political Views among Chinese in Europe

Notably, 17,3% of respondents in our survey refused to answer at least one of the four questions on political trust in or satisfaction with the Chinese and host-country governments (Figure 8). This baseline rate is itself informative: even in a fully anonymous, voluntary survey conducted outside China, roughly one in six respondents chose not to state a position on the political systems at stake consistent with the assumption of this working paper that authoritarian influence over voice can follow diaspora communities abroad rather than stopping at the border.

Non-response is not evenly distributed across the sample, and several patterns are worth flagging. First, by origin, respondents born in mainland China refuse least often (13%), while

[15] See, for instance, Link, 'China'; Hillenbrand, *Negative Exposures*.
[16] Stern and Hassid, 'Amplifying Silence'.


both those born in Hong Kong (29%), Taiwan (18%), and those born in the host country (18%) refuse markedly more.[17] This may reflect that mainland-born respondents' attitudes skew more readily toward loyalty (Table 1) and are therefore less costly to voice, whereas Hong Kong/Taiwan-origin and host-born respondents may hold more conflicted or critical views that are harder to state safely within diaspora community contexts still oriented toward the mainland and an instance of voice being restrained precisely where it is most likely to be critical.

Second, several individual-level factors show associations with non-response, though not always in the direction one might expect. Women refuse more often than men (18% vs. 10%). Younger respondents (lowest age tertile) refuse considerably more than older respondents (18% vs. 13%), the opposite of what a generational-exposure account of authoritarian caution might predict. Education shows no clear monotonic pattern, though the smallest categories (primary and middle school) have too few respondents for a reliable read and should be treated with caution. Both Orientation Toward Authority (OTA) and Definition of Self-Interest (DSI) are scored so that higher values indicate more traditional dispositions, a greater deference to elders and in-laws for OTA, and a greater tendency to restrain one's own opinion for the sake of group harmony for DSI. On both measures, refusal declines as traditionalism increases: from 17% among the least authority-deferential respondents to effectively 0% among the most (though the top OTA category contains very few respondents and should be read with caution), and from 18% among the least group-harmony-oriented respondents to around 9% among the most. In other words, the respondents whose cultural orientation most directly encodes a norm of restraining one's own voice for the sake of harmony are the ones least likely to withhold an answer in our survey.

[17] Respondents from Macao are excluded here due to the small sample size.

Figure 8. Non-Response Based on Respondent Characteristics

Share of respondents refusing at least one government trust/satisfaction item



4.2 Implications

These patterns carry two distinct implications. The first implication is **methodological**: because non-response is not random, the government-trust and satisfaction estimates reported in Figure 6 are drawn from a selectively silent sample, and if refusal correlates with holding more critical (or more conflicted) attitudes, estimates of loyalty toward either government may be biased upward for exactly the subgroups most likely to withhold. This is a limitation any survey targeting diaspora from authoritarian contexts needs to account for.

The second implication is **substantive**: identifying who is most vulnerable to this form of self-censorship is a precondition for protecting them. Our results point to host-born and HK/Taiwan/Macao-origin respondents, women, and younger diaspora members as the subgroups most likely to withhold a political opinion altogether. These are the groups whose attitudes we understand least well as a result. For policymakers and researchers seeking to reach these groups, this suggests two complementary directions: first, methodological innovations that lower the perceived cost of voicing an opinion (stronger anonymity guarantees, indirect measurement techniques, community-trusted intermediaries for outreach); and second, further research into why these groups stay silent (whether out of fear of retaliation, pressure of conformity within the host context, discomfort with the topic, or simple disengagement) since the appropriate policy response differs sharply depending on which mechanism is at work.

5. Key Takeaways

This working paper set out to examine how authoritarian regimes shape the political attitudes and voice of diaspora communities abroad, using the case of Chinese propaganda in Europe. Bringing together our experimental findings on propaganda framing and our observational findings on survey non-response, several conclusions stand out.

1. **Information promotion and information restraining are complementary, not competing, mechanisms.** Authoritarian regimes manage diaspora political voice on two separate margins: manipulation shapes *what* attitudes people hold and are willing to express, while coercion shapes *whether* an attitude is voiced at all, independent of its content.
2. **Non-response is itself a form of restrained voice.** Respondents who refuse to answer government-trust questions are effectively removed from the loyalty/voice scheme (Table 1) altogether. Our experimental findings on attitude change can only speak to those who chose to answer.

3. **This is a likely source of bias, not just a limitation.** The diaspora members most cautious about voicing political opinions are structurally the least visible in survey-based attitude research. The true population-level attitudes may differ from what we observe among survey completers.
4. **Countering authoritarian influence requires two distinct levers, not one.** Reducing the reach or credibility of manipulative content (e.g., outlets like the European Times) addresses the attitude-shaping channel but does nothing to address restrain-driven silence. Effective policy responses need to separately target content exposure *and* the conditions under which diaspora members feel safe expressing an opinion in the first place.

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Appendix

Figure A1. Experimental Stimuli



***Note**. The three articles present a placebo message (left), an affirmation message (middle), and a deprivation message (right) highlighting the situation of Chinese students in Germany*

Figure A2. Effects of Frames on Emotions




Figure A3. Effects of Frames on Government Support/Satisfaction




Figure A4. Effects of Frames on Identity

