About ARM

Coordinated by the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), the ARM project delves into authoritarian strategies for information control beyond borders. While foreign disinformation receives ample scrutiny, other forms of foreign information manipulation and intervention (FIMI) remain overlooked.

Analyzing Russia, China, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, ARM conceptualises and addresses different forms of FIMI. The project will explore the extent that major global players like China and Russia, alongside Ethiopia and Rwanda, engage in transnational information suppression, particularly targeting European diaspora communities.

Partners

Countries

Case Studies

Toolkit

Our Work

The ARM Project is a 38-month Horizon Europe-funded project that started in January 2024, and will finish in February 2027. The project is broken down into eight work packages with four case studies and 13 public deliverables.

The project will deliver academic papers, field blogs and policy briefs, together with a catalogue of the tactics, techniques and procedures used to carry out FIMI and a toolkit of practical countermeasures. The eight work packages will all collaborate to deliver the project’s goal of effective research for increased information freedom.

Work Plan

ARM Work Package Plan

Case Studies

ARM explores the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) related to information control in each of the four case-study countries. Its aim is to understand the impact of different aspects of information on contentious issues for each country. 

China

In the last decade, China has become increasingly present around the globe. One area in which various actors affiliated with China are becoming more active in relates to information flows. Such developments have sparked various questions and discussions in the scholarly and public debate in Europe. What is the role of Chinese media in shaping information abroad? To what extent is China’s influence challenging academic freedom for scholars based outside China? And what role do Chinese technology companies play in Europe’s information ecosystem?  

Objectives 

  • Investigate and map mechanisms of information control relevant to the European context 
  • Understand how information changes in various spheres in the context of controversial topics and events 
  • Study the role of various actors in such dynamics 

Led by the Hertie School Centre for Digital Governance. 

Russia

Context

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the country has greatly intensified its efforts to control information. Civic and political rights, including press freedom and freedom of expression, are severely curtailed, while independent media and other critical actors have been forced into exile.

In parallel to its extensive domestic repression, Russia’s efforts to influence and control information extend transnationally to, among others, the EU.

Objectives

  • Document efforts, strategies, actors and legislation involved in domestic and transnational suppression of information by Russia.
  • Understand how information freedom is upheld or challenged in the context of different contentious topics and events, such as Russia’s war against Ukraine.
  • Investigate the mediated dynamics of information suppression offline and online in Russia and in Russian diasporas across selected European countries.

Led by Maastricht University.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s political space narrowed significantly after the contested 2005 elections, as the government cracked down on opposition, civil society, and media. Between 2008 and 2009, repressive legislations were enacted, including anti-terrorism, media, and civil society laws, which has subsequently had a detrimental effect on information freedom. 

The coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 sparked hopes of an end to repression and an opening of space for media freedoms. However, after multiple civil conflicts in the country, repression and information suppression have returned to the political scene.  

Objectives 

  • Document efforts, strategies, actors and legislation involved in the promotion and control of information freedom within Ethiopia and within Ethiopian communities abroad. 
  • Understand how information freedom is upheld or challenged in the context of different controversial topics and events, including multiple violent conflicts in Ethiopia, growing Chinese influence, and the Russian war in Ukraine. 
  • Investigate the mediated dynamics of information control offline and online in Ethiopia and its diaspora across selected European countries. 

Led by the University of Helsinki.

Rwanda

The Rwandan government actively markets the country as a beacon of stability, security and economic progress. However, amidst these accolades lies a reality of stringent information control wielded by the state, effectively silencing dissent both domestically and overseas.  

The mechanisms employed to enforce this control are intricate and subtle, prioritising a positive portrayal of the regime rather than overt suppression. This is despite the disturbing trend of government critics meeting untimely ends – even when they are abroad.  

This elaborate strategy spans various tactics – from censoring traditional media channels and manipulating social media platforms, to influencing international business landscapes, discrediting critical academics abroad, and shaping narratives in Western media outlets.  

Objectives 

  • To investigate and map forms of information suppression within Rwanda that are relevant for the Rwandan regime’s information manipulation abroad  
  • To investigate and map information suppression operations around contested issues  
  • To investigate and map information suppression in Rwandan diasporas in selected European countries  
  • To contribute to a conceptualisation of information suppression. 

Led by University of Lund.

Consortium