Abstract

This working paper examines how Russia seeks to suppress information as part of its foreign information interference and manipulation (FIMI) activities. It analyses the tactics and techniques (TTPs) of information suppression Russia employs domestically, as well as to silence critical voices located outside of Russia. Information suppression is a complicated phenomenon, which is best understood by differentiating between actions aimed at the (1) production, (2) dissemination, and (3) salience of information.

In addition, this working paper analyses how Russia’s information suppression activities are perceived among different “generations” of Russophone diaspora communities in Latvia and Estonia.

Identifying a broad variety of techniques targeting the production, dissemination and salience of information, the paper shows how, in recent years, Russia has intensified its information suppression efforts domestically and transnationally. These techniques have been employed to, first, silence and limit the reach of independent reporting and research, as well as of voices critical of the Putin regime.

Within this overarching tactic, controlling information related to Russia’s war against Ukraine has become key to government strategy since 2022, resulting in a sharp acceleration of information suppression and other forms of repression, including in Europe. Second, Russia aims to undermine EU/NATO cohesion and foster polarisation across Europe. States with large Russophone communities, such as Estonia and Latvia, are important targets where Russia aims to “manage” information salience to its advantage.

Focus group research on the perception of information suppression in Latvia and Estonia conducted, by the ARM project, demonstrates how, among Baltic Russian-speakers, only some interpret Russia’s suppression of information as an authoritarian practice designed to shape public beliefs and secure loyalty to the regime. Others normalise information suppression in Russia, viewing these measures as efforts to prevent dissent and maintain stability. Russophones who moved to the Baltics after 1991, especially post-February 2022, however, are more critical of Russia than those who lived there before the collapse of the Soviet Union. This stresses the need to differentiate within diaspora communities and illustrates how interventions to protect the information environment from foreign interference can be perceived as illegitimate or repressive.